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1. Introduction  
There is widespread belief that microcredit can be effective in reducing global pov-
erty. At the same time, the fact that microcredit relies on private enterprise, as well 
as the gender bias, appeals strongly to donors and NGOs alike. In conjunction, 
these factors have resulted in a significant growth in microcredit funding and out-
reach. According to the Microcredit Summit Campaign, there were more than 150 
million microcredit clients in the world (more than two thirds were women) as of 
December 2007 (Banerjee et al., 2009).  
Notwithstanding these developments, thoroughly tested knowledge about the im-
pact and effect of microcredit is partial and contested. The knowledge base mostly 
consists of anecdotal evidence and case studies, and research has generally failed to 
account for the potentially severe endogeneity problems (see below) and/or has not 
measured associated costs and benefits properly. Yet, this has not held the World 
Bank’s Consultative Group to Assist the Poor (CGAP) back from announcing that 
there is mounting evidence that microcredit can help achieve the Millennium De-
velopment Goals (MDGs) (Banerjee et al., 2009).  
The objective of this synthesis study is to answer the following key question: What 
can be said about the causal impact of a microcredit programme on the basis of ex-
isting evaluations? Second, and related to the above-mentioned question, the study 
will also evaluate the methodology used in current microcredit evaluations under-
taken by donors. 
It is customary to distinguish between microfinance and microcredit. Microfinance 
covers a range of financial services (credit, savings, insurance) whereas microcredit 
is the provision of small loans.1 Here focus is on the microcredit tool. Consequently, 
the evaluations and studies included in this review are of programmes offering mi-
crocredit, although a number of the evaluated programmes also offer savings and 
other services.  
                                                 
1 In addition to programmes focusing on the provision of credit, microcredit is sometimes offered in combi-
nation with savings, education etc. and is also sometimes offered as a part of development programmes with 
a wider scope than merely providing credit.  
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The emergence of microcredit2 is often associated with loans to individuals in soli-
darity groups with joint liability, where the group members essentially substitute for 
collateral.3 Yet group lending is one among several microcredit lending technolo-
gies.4 Individual loan contracts with dynamic incentives and public repayment ses-
sions are also widespread. The evaluations considered in this review represent 
microcredit programmes utilizing both group- and individual lending technologies.  
So far, empirical studies of microcredit programmes have focused on estimating 
microcredit impact on consumption and income and on financial indicators such as 
loan recovery rates. A recent trend among microcredit providers has been to include 
social impacts (e.g. gender empowerment effects) in their internal impact evalua-
tions. To assess the strength of microcredit as a development tool surely all dimen-
sions are important, but if focus is on poverty alleviation then the impact on 
consumption and income are prime indicators. Consequently, the studies considered 
in this synthesis study focus on the impact on consumption and income from par-
ticipation in a microcredit programme.  
The evaluations reviewed in this synthesis study are published by both bi- and multi-
lateral donors, by international NGOs and in peer-reviewed international journals. 
Most of the evaluations have been published during the last decade. The fact that 
microcredit has been developed and operated on the largest scale in Asia and Latin 
America is reflected by the large number of evaluations in this synthesis study focus-
ing on microcredit in these areas. 
An evaluation of the impact of a microcredit programme essentially needs to ask the 
question: What would have happened in the absence of the programme? This ques-
tion is by nature impossible to answer as one cannot simultaneously observe the 
same individual both exposed and not exposed to the programme. A simple and 
frequently used solution is to observe an individual before and after entering the 
programme and observe if any changes arise. However, changes can rarely be as-
cribed solely to the programme as other factors may change over the same period. 
Much effort by evaluators has therefore been put into the construction of relevant 
control groups. That is: groups of individual who resemble those exposed to a mi-
crocredit programme without being exposed to it. Much, however, depends upon 
                                                 
2 Chapter Three in Armendariz and Morduch (2005) provide a historical overview of microcredit develop-
ments and trends.  
3 Group lending mitigates the problems of adverse selection (i.e. that the individuals with a risk-taking behaviour 
are more likely to demand a loan in the absence of liability) and moral hazard (i.e. that incentives to make the 
project yield high returns may be less in the absence of liability).  
4Only 9% of the 890 microbanks that reported to the “MicroBanking Bulletin” (autumn 2008) exclusively 
rely on group lending. A total of 49% use a combination of group and individual lending.  
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the similarity between the individuals (in the treatment group) who have received 
microcredit and the individuals (in the control group) who were not exposed to mi-
crocredit. This is a challenge for every (microcredit) evaluation, and one independ-
ent contribution of this report is to critically assess applied methodologies and their 
impact on the reported results. 
Even though microcredit advocates claim that microcredit is solely about improving 
access to capital, microcredit programmes can affect existing credit markets, chang-
ing, for example, the level of competition in the local credit market. Evaluations are 
seldom concerned with these interaction effects among the different suppliers of 
credit. 
From a practitioner’s point of view, assessing the potential for microcredit as a pov-
erty reduction tool is the key criteria. In addition, practitioners worry whether mi-
crocredit is sustainable (i.e. profitable for the lender) in the longer run, and whether 
supporting microcredit is cost-effective relative to other interventions. Little is 
known on this subject and it is consequently outside the scope of this study to ad-
dress it. A related question also outside the scope of the present review is whether 
funding and implementing agencies should primarily focus on developing the mi-
crocredit infrastructure or provide direct operational funding. This question is obvi-
ously related to the sustainability issue, because as long as microcredit to the poor is 
not financially sustainable, outside funding is needed.  
Following the Introduction, Chapter 2 presents methodological considerations used 
to identify key evaluation questions needed for scoring the different studies accord-
ing to how well they identify the causal impact of a given microcredit programme. 
Chapter 3 presents and discusses the available research on this issue, whilst the 
evaluations and studies conducted by donors are presented in Chapter 4. Donor 
evaluations are ranked according to how well they can be used as basis for a deci-
sion to scale up the programme in question. Scoring methodology and rationale as 
well as the results of the scoring exercise is presented and discussed in Chapter 5, 
before Chapter 6 concludes, summarizing the main lessons of the study.  
 7
2. Impact evaluation methodology5 
In order to investigate whether receiving a microcredit loan raises borrower income, 
we face a rather difficult counterfactual problem. That is, we must ask: How would 
the individuals, who received a microcredit loan, have fared in the absence of the 
loan? The difficulty is immediate: At a given point in time, an individual is either 
exposed to the microcredit loan or not exposed. Comparing the same individual 
over time will rarely provide a reliable estimate of programme impact, the reason 
being that other things are rarely equal. For this reason we cannot obtain an estimate 
of the impact of the loan on each and every individual. What we can do, however, is 
to estimate an average impact of microcredit loans on a group of individuals by 
comparing them with a similar group that did not receive loans.  
Consequently, a key step in impact evaluation is the creation of a credible control 
group. This is a group of individuals who, in the absence of the loan, would have 
had outcomes broadly similar to those who received the loan (the treatment group). 
The hope is therefore that the control group will provide a good gauge of what 
would have happened to the treatment group if it had not received the loan. Conse-
quently, comparing the two groups by looking at the difference between the treat-
ment group and the control group provides the estimated average impact on the 
group in question.  
However, if the people/households that receive microcredit (the treated6) and those 
who do not (the untreated) are different, just looking at the difference between the 
two groups will lump together pre-existing differences (selection bias) and the im-
pact of the programme.7 Because we have no way of estimating the size of the selec-
tion bias with certainty, we cannot decompose the observed difference into an 
average treatment effect and a bias term. We therefore have to ask: Under what 
conditions will the difference between the treated and the untreated consistently 
estimate the average effect of the programme? A sufficient condition for consis-
                                                 
5 This section builds mostly on Duflo (2004) and Winship and Morgan (1999). 
6 The origin of a considerable part of evaluation terminology is medical/clinical experiments – a context 
where the meaning of terms like “treatment” and “control” may be more intuitive.  
7 In microcredit programmes, which often rely on solidarity groups, micro-entrepreneurs have a clear incen-
tive to form groups with other good micro-entrepreneurs so as to avoid cross-subsidizing bad micro-
entrepreneurs (Ghatak, 1999). Technically, there is assortative matching in group formation. This means that 
those who receive a loan are more “able” than those who do not.  
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tency of the estimate is that the assignment of individuals into treatment (i.e. receiv-
ing a microcredit loan) is random. If this is the case, it can be shown that the differ-
ence between the treated and the untreated is a consistent estimator8 of the effect of 
the programme (the treatment). For this reason, randomization is often seen as “the 
gold standard” research design. 
Consider now an evaluation of the effect of a microcredit programme on the in-
come levels of poor female micro-entrepreneurs. The programme participants re-
ceive a small microcredit loan, whereas the control group does not receive a loan. 
Now, if the people who choose (or are chosen) to participate in the programme sys-
tematically differ from those who do not participate, the assignment into treatment 
and control groups will be non-random. This will, for example, be the case if par-
ticipants are more entrepreneurial and/or wealthier than non-participants. Assume 
now that after the loan is repaid (one year later, say) we observe that the female mi-
cro-entrepreneurs in the treatment group have experienced an increase in levels of 
income, whereas those in the control group have not. Does this mean that the given 
microcredit programmes have raised income levels of the female micro entrepre-
neurs? Without further analysis, we don’t know!  
From the above discussion, it is possible to identify three possible explanations for 
the raised income levels of the female micro-entrepreneurs: 
i) Microcredit increases income levels by relieving credit constraints among the 
poor female micro entrepreneurs. This is the true average treatment effect of the 
programme, which we wish to estimate.  
ii) Female micro-entrepreneurs, who received microcredit in the example provided, 
are more motivated and more entrepreneurial than those who did not receive 
microcredit. This can be thought of as a baseline difference between programme 
participants and non-participants, which originates from the non-random selec-
tion of programme participants. The notion that the programme appeals 
to/attracts a certain type of people/household is also known as assortative 
matching; a name reflecting that participation and the match between pro-
gramme and participants is not random. 
iii) Finally, the entrepreneurial ability of those who received microcredit may in-
crease more than it would have done for the control group even if they had re-
ceived microcredit. This will occur if the effect of participation differs across the 
treated and untreated, for example if participants (due to their inherent charac-
teristics/ability) gain more from participation.  
                                                 
8 Technically, consistency means that the estimator gives us the “true” average treatment effect as the number 
of program participants grows without bound. 
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Points ii) and iii) are the biases that any impact study must aim to neutralise in order 
to estimate the effect of the programme. Failure to do so convincingly weakens any 
conclusions drawn. In what follows, we will simply refer to points ii) and iii) as en-
dogeneity9 bias. 
In conclusion, this brief introduction to the evaluation problem has provided a basic 
insight into the complexity of both the problem and the potential solutions when 
seeking to answer the seemingly simple question of whether a micro loan has had an 
effect on household income or not.  
 
                                                 
9 In this context endogeneity means that unobserved characteristics and abilities of the participants affect 
participation and the outcomes of participation. 
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3. Peer-reviewed impact evaluation studies  
In theory, randomized assignment into treatment eliminates any bias. Unfortunately, 
there is a dearth of impact evaluation relying on this methodology.10 Impact studies 
mostly use observational data and try to eliminate bias by recourse to more or less 
sophisticated statistical methods and/or quasi-experimental11 designs. In what fol-
lows we discuss the few peer-reviewed impact evaluation studies.  
3.1 Microcredit in Bangladesh 
The leading study on microcredit in Bangladesh is Pitt and Khandker (1998 pub-
lished in the Journal of Political Economy, a top five economics journal. Pitt and 
Khandker evaluate three group-based Bangladeshi credit programs: the Grameen 
Bank, BRAC12, and the Bangladesh Rural Development Board (BRDB). Their point 
of departure is that previous studies are unsound as they only compare outcomes 
between participating and non-participating households. That is, previous studies 
simply employ the standard estimator on observational data. This means that they 
are tainted by endogeneity bias, and therefore uninformative about true average 
treatment effects.  
Pitt and Khandker identify three main sources of potential endogeneity bias, which 
they aim to tackle. These are non-random programme placement, unmeasured vil-
lage-level attributes that affect both the demand for programme credit and eco-
nomic outcomes, and unmeasured household-level attributes that affect both the 
demand for programme credit and economic outcomes. In order to eliminate the 
resulting endogeneity bias, Pitt and Khandker provide identification of the treat-
ment effect through a quasi-experimental design.  
More specifically, they include in the sample households who live in treatment vil-
lages but who are excluded from participating in the programme based on an ex-
                                                 
10 We know of only two studies using randomization, Karlan and Zinman (2008) and Banerjee et al. (2009). 
11 As implied by its name quasi-experiments are almost true experiments – often missing the randomized 
allocation into a treatment and a control group to account for both selection and placebo effects. While there 
are many varieties of quasi-experimental evaluations designs, they all seek to overcome this basic lack of ran-
domly allocated treatment and control groups.  
12 BRAC was founded in 1972 as the Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee. It is today mostly known 
by its acronym BRAC. 
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ogenous13 rule imposed by the NGOs offering the microcredit. The rule in question 
is enforced to ensure the poverty orientation of the microcredit programmes impos-
ing that only households owning less than half an acre of land can participate in the 
three microcredit programs. Pitt and Khandker compares economic outcomes be-
tween households who can participate and households who cannot. The compari-
son is conditional on village-level fixed effects (to tackle unobserved village-level 
attributes) and observed household and individual attributes. Moreover, since Pitt 
and Khandker have included households who live in treatment villages but who are 
excluded from participating in the programme, they can alleviate concerns about 
non-random programme placement. That is, by comparing the difference between 
treated and untreated in programme villages with the difference between eligible-
untreated and ineligible-untreated in control villages, concerns about non-random 
programme placement are alleviated. The key assumption when it comes to identifi-
cation of the effects of the microcredit is therefore that landownership is exogenous 
to the allocation of credit. Pitt and Khandkers results depend crucially on the as-
sumption that landownership is uncorrelated with (unobserved) household charac-
teristics that affect either the likelihood of being enrolled in the microcredit 
programmes and/or the effect of getting access to microcredit. This assumption is, 
for example, violated if the household who owns land are more entrepreneurial and 
therefore more likely to access credit.  
Data are from a multipurpose household survey conducted in 87 villages of 29 sub-
districts in rural Bangladesh during 1991/92. The 29 sub-districts were chosen with 
equal probability from among 391 sub-districts. In the sample, 24 of the sub-
districts had a microcredit programme running, whereas 5 did not. The total number 
of households is 1,798, and among these 905 participated in a microcredit program. 
The principal finding of the evaluation is that an additional taka of credit provided 
to women adds 0.18 taka to total annual household expenditure, as compared to 
0.11 for men. These results are statistically significant.14  
The findings by Pitt and Khandker, however, remain open to debate. In an unpub-
lished but widely cited paper,15 Morduch (1998) has argued that the exogenous eligi-
bility rule based on landholdings is frequently violated. It is, for example, noted that 
30% of Grameen borrowers own more land than the half-acre cut off, with land-
holdings as large as 14 acres. Morduch moreover showed that an alternative estima-
                                                 
13 Exogenous refers to the rule being set in order to target the programme to the poor and not to affect per-
formance and related effects of participation.  
14 Please note, that the effect measured here is the marginal impact of programme – i.e. the effect of provid-
ing an additional taka of credit. This should not be confused with the total effect of the programme. 
15 In a recent book published by MIT Press, a leading academic publisher, Armendáriz and Morduch (2005) 
raise the Morduch (1998) criticisms anew. 
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tor failed to detect a positive impact of microcredit. In a rejoinder to Morduch, Pitt 
(1999) argues that Morduch has misunderstood and mischaracterized the methods 
of Pitt and Khandker and has applied incorrect methods to obtain his new evidence. 
Moreover, Khandker (2005) extends the Pitt and Khandker (1998) study by using, in 
addition to the 1991/92 data, follow-up data collected in 1998/99. This allows 
Khandker to employ panel data methods, which provides a range of econometric 
benefits. Khandker’s (2005) findings confirm the original Pitt and Khandker (1998) 
results. Moreover, using the Pitt-Khandker data, Mckernan (2002) finds that micro-
credit increased the profit generated by household enterprise activities.  
3.2 Microcredit in Thailand 
The leading study on microcredit in Thailand is Coleman (1999). The study is pub-
lished in the Journal of Development Economics, the top field journal in development 
economics. Coleman relies on a survey of 445 households in 14 villages Northeast 
Thailand in 1995/96. Eight of the villages are supported by the Rural Friends Asso-
ciation (RFA), and six are supported by the Foundation for Integrated Agricultural 
Management (FIAM).16 The unique feature of the Coleman study (and crucial for his 
identification strategy) is that that the RFA and FIAM in January 1995 pre-identified 
four villages and two villages, respectively, where they would begin supporting with 
village bank loans in 1996. In February and March 1995, field staff organized the 
villagers into new village banks, allowing them to self-select according to the stan-
dard procedures normally used to organize new village banks, the only difference 
being that the villagers were told that loans would begin approximately one year 
later. By implication, a perfect control group of would-be village bank members was 
identified. Indeed, this unique setup allows Coleman (via a refined difference-in-
difference approach) to control for both non-random member selection and non-
random programme placement.  
Coleman finds two interesting results. First, when one does not address the endoge-
neity issue, i.e. when one relies on the standard estimator, programme impacts are 
significantly overestimated. Second, when one does take endogeneity into account, 
the effect of microcredit on women’s income is not significantly different from 
zero. Because of the unique design, there are no obvious threats to internal validity 
of results. However, Coleman himself argues that there are threats to external valid-
ity. Thailand is a relatively wealthy country with annual GDP growth at close to 
10% for the two decades leading up to the survey, and many villagers already had 
access to low-interest credit from financial institutions such as the Bank for Agricul-
                                                 
16 RFA and FIAM are Thai NGOs who have promoted village banks since 1988. Both receive financial and 
technical assistance from the American NGO Catholic Relief Services (CRS). The operation of both NGOs’ 
village banks is virtually identical as both follow the FINCA village banking methodology. 
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ture and Agricultural Cooperatives. In such an environment, it should not be sur-
prising that small loans would have a negligible impact. Indeed, a common com-
plaint of women surveyed was that the size of village bank loans was far too small 
for them to be productive. Consequently, as stressed by Coleman, caution is in or-
der before extrapolation of these results. 
Another study of microcredit in (rural and semi-urban) Thailand is Kaboski and 
Townsend (2005). This study is published in the Journal of the European Economic Asso-
ciation, a top 20 economics journal. In contrast to previous work, this study examines 
a large set of heterogeneous village-level microfinance institutions.17 It links impacts 
on households to variation in the characteristics and policies of these institutions, 
and evaluates whether the observed impacts of these types of intermediation are 
consistent with what theories predict. The theories in question are structural general 
equilibrium models of growth with either endogenous or exogenous financial inter-
mediation assuming that households have limited access to credit and/or savings 
services. 
More specifically, the paper relies on household and institution level data from a 
survey conducted in May 1997 (before the Asian financial crisis) in four Thai prov-
inces (changwats). The survey design was based partly on results of prior field re-
search. The survey has three subcomponents: the institutional module, the 
household module,18 and the key informant module. The institutional survey was 
given to all known microfinance institutions that were encountered in the villages at 
the time of the household survey. In total, records for 161 institutions were ob-
tained across 108 of the villages. Survey questions focused on both the individual 
policies and the experiences of the institutions, including their founding, member-
ship, and saving and lending services.19 The most common type of institution en-
countered is production credit groups (CDD), whose members are mostly the 
better-off women. CDD mostly lend cash. Another common institution is rice 
banks, which usually make small-term, emergency consumption loans intended for 
consumption smoothing purposes. The form or type of the institution is not the 
only dimension of variation among the entities in the institutional survey. The sur-
vey also contains data on services, policies and characteristics of the institutions, 
which offers much variation. 
                                                 
17 Kaboski and Townsend argue that the fact that their institutions are operated at the village level is a virtue. 
These village-level entities are promoted by a variety of different agencies and ministries, and Kaboski and 
Townsend rely on this variation as an instrument to identify impacts.  
18 The household survey was administered to 2,880 Thai households: 15 households in each of 192 survey 
villages. Households provided an extensive array of demographic and socioeconomic information. 
19 These institutions are all quasi-formal: that is, they keep records and often have bank accounts, but do not 
in general have their own office. Most also have some relationship to the Thai government, despite being 
administered at the local level. The government agencies also offer various types of assistance such as ac-
counting assistance. 
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The Kaboski-Townsend study asks whether microfinance produces the impacts of 
financial intermediation predicted by theory. Their empirical strategy is to estimate 
impact using variables associated with financial intermediation, whose variation is 
either exogenous, or endogenous in ways that can be controlled. The variables they 
use are the presence of (or membership in) the institution, the different types of 
institutions, and the different policies. They examine two sets of policies: one set of 
policies associated with successful financial intermediation in the data; and a second 
set involving policies such as group liability, dynamic incentives, or better monitor-
ing technologies, policies predicted to be important by theory. For policies, Kaboski 
and Townsend lack independent membership data, and so can only look at the ef-
fect of institutions with these policies on outcomes of the average villager, not on 
individual members. For institutions overall, and each of the different types of insti-
tutions, they have membership data, and so can address individual villager impact.  
The focus on membership introduces the issue of household-level selection bias. 
Households that are members of village institutions (in villages with institutions) 
may differ systematically from non-member households in the same villages. If 
these differences are the result of biased selection into the institutions (whether on 
the part of the household demand or the institution supply) they should not be at-
tributed to the impact of the institution. To address this, Kaboski and Townsend 
use the presence of the institution in the village (a village-level variable) as instru-
ment for membership. Finally, they address endogenous programme placement 
problems using a wide range of village-level controls. 
Two very interesting results emerge from the analysis: First, households in villages 
that hold specialized institutions offering emergency loans were 10-29 percentage 
points less likely to reduce consumption in years with negative income shocks. This 
result does not, however, hold for the “average” institution, where in fact there is no 
risk alleviating effect; if anything there is a troubling risk-increasing effect. Second, 
microfinance institutions reduce reliance on moneylenders, and this result is very 
robust. The effect on the average villager is to reduce the probability of becoming a 
moneylender costumer by 8 percentage points. Kaboski and Townsend interpret 
this as microfinance institutions loosening households’ constraints on formal credit, 
at least to credit that could be acquired alternatively from moneylenders. This effect 
is particularly manifest for women’s groups. 
3.3 Microcredit in South Africa 
While the above studies have focused on credit to micro-entrepreneurs, Karlan and 
Zinman (2008) experimentally explore the impact of consumer credit. The study is 
forthcoming in the Review of Financial Studies, which is a leading field journal in fi-
nance. The experiment was implemented by a consumer lender in a high-interest 
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rate, high-risk South African loan market where credit constraints appeared to be 
binding. Karlan and Zinman address the identification issue by making the lender 
introduce exogenous variation in the loan approval process.20 Their “treatment” 
randomly encouraged loan officers to approve some marginal applications. Specifi-
cally, the lender added three additional steps to its normal process for new loan ap-
plicants: (i) Loan officers were told to mark rejected applications as either extremely 
or marginally uncreditworthy (a total of 786 applicants were deemed marginally un-
creditworthy). (ii) A computer then instructed the officer to re-evaluate the marginal 
applications in real-time by randomly producing a message to “approve” or “still 
reject.” Neither the treatment (computer said “approve”) nor the control (computer 
said “reject”) groups were informed by the lender that a component of the loan de-
cision was randomized. Officers were told by management to follow the computer’s 
instructions in all cases. (iii) Loan officers had financial incentives to be conserva-
tive; they approved the loan only in roughly half of the cases where the computer 
instructed them to approve. Consequently, Karlan and Zinman “only” study the 
impacts on marginal applicants – that is the effect on the participants who where 
almost eligible for participation in the programme. This should not be confused 
with measuring the effect on those who where found eligible to participate in the 
first round. This is important to note because the treatment effect may differ be-
tween the two categories.  
The outcome data used were from the lender’s records on repayment and profitabil-
ity, from credit-bureau reports over two years after the start of the experiment, and 
from household surveys conducted by an independent firm at the home or work-
place of the marginal applicants six to twelve months after the start of the experi-
ment. The survey measured borrowing activity, loan uses, and a range of proxies for 
household well-being. 
Results indicate that expanded access to credit considerably enhanced outcomes in a 
variety of dimensions. In particular, Karlan and Zinman found that over a 6 to 12 
month horizon after the experiment ended (i.e., the initial loan repayments were 
due), applicants in the treatment group experienced higher consumption. House-
holds randomly assigned a loan were an estimated 5.8 percentage points less likely to 
report hunger (p-value of 0.03), and 3.7 percentage points more likely to report a 
food quality improvement, but this effect was statistically insignificant (p-value of 
0.32). 
                                                 
20 The particular Lender was merged with a larger bank in 2005 and thus no longer exists as a separate entity.  
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3.4 Microcredit in India 
In a new paper from the MIT Poverty Action Lab, Banerjee et al. (2009) report re-
sults from the first randomized evaluation of the impact of the canonical group-
lending microcredit model. This study is at present unpublished. However, given the 
professional standing of the authors (two of them, Abhijit Banerjee and Esther Du-
flo, are leading development economists); we have chosen to include it. 
In 2005, 52 of 104 neighbourhoods21 in Hyderabad (the fifth largest city in India, 
and the capital of Andhra Pradesh, the Indian State where microcredit has expanded 
the fastest) were randomly selected for opening of a microfinance branch by one of 
the fastest growing microfinance institutions in the area, Spandana, while the re-
mainder were not.22 Fifteen to 18 months after the introduction of microcredit in 
each area, a comprehensive household survey was conducted in an average of 65 
households in each slum, a total of 6,850 households.  
Turning to the results, Banerjee et al. report that there is no significant difference in 
total household expenditure per adult equivalent between treatment and comparison 
areas.23 The average household in a comparison area has expenditure of Rs (Indian 
rupees) 1,420 per adult equivalent per month; in treatment areas the number is 
1,453, not statistically different. They also report that women in treatment areas 
were no more likely to be make decisions about household spending, investment, 
savings, or education. There is no effect on health or education outcomes, either. 
Households in treatment areas spend no more on medical and sanitation than do 
comparison households, and among households with children, households in treat-
ment areas were no less likely to report that a child had a major illness in the past 
year. Among households with school aged children, households in treatment areas 
are not more likely to have children in school. Looking just at girls’ school enrol-
ment gives the same conclusion. Treatment households also do not spend more on 
                                                 
21 These areas were selected based on having no pre-existing microcredit presence, and having residents who 
were desirable potential borrowers: poor, but not “the poorest of the poor”. While those areas are commonly 
referred to as “slums”, these are permanent settlements, with concrete houses, and some public amenities 
(electricity, water, etc.). The population in the neighborhoods selected for the study ranges from 46 to 555. 
22 The basic Spandana product is the group loan product. A group is comprised of six to 10 women, and 25-
45 groups form a “centre”. Women are jointly responsible for the loan of their group, and of the centre. The 
first loan is Rs. 10,000 (about $200 at market exchange rates, or $1,000 at PPP-adjusted exchange rates). It 
takes 50 weeks to reimburse principal and interest rate; the interest rate is 12% (non-declining balance; 
equivalent to a 20% APR). If they all reimburse they are eligible for second loans of 3 Rs. 10,000-12,000; 
loans amounts increase up to Rs. 20,000. Unlike other microcredit organizations, Spandana does not require 
its clients to borrow to start a business: the organization recognizes that money is fungible, and clients are left 
entirely free to chose the best use of the money, as long as they repay their loan. Eligibility is determined 
using the following criteria: (a) female, (b) aged 18 to 59, (c) residing in the same area for at least one year, (d) 
has valid identification and residential proof (ration card, voter card, or electricity bill), (e) at least 80% of 
women in a group must own their home. Groups are formed by women themselves, not by Spandana. 
23 Due to the presence of spill over effects, they rely on what they denote the intent to treat estimator (ITT): 
ITT compares averages over treatment and control areas. 
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schooling: spending on tuition, school fees and uniforms is the same in treatment 
and comparison areas. 
3.5 Summing up 
The different studies covered above do not provide an unambiguous depiction of 
the impact of microcredit on key variables of interest such as income and consump-
tion. Morduch (1998), Coleman (1999) and Banerjee et al. (2009) found no effect, 
while the other studies found mildly positive effects. 
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4. Donor impact evaluations of microcredit 
Over the past decade impact evaluations have, as pointed out by Khalily (2004), 
come to dominate both the research and evaluation agendas within microcredit. Ac-
cording to Hulme (2000) this was caused by the advent of a “value for money”, re-
sults-oriented political agenda in especially donor countries, leading to an increased 
focus on proving and documenting the outcome(s) and effectiveness of microfi-
nance programmes. 
The assessments of the implications and benefits associated with this emphasis on 
impact evaluations, however, vary considerably. Karlan and Goldberg (2007) find 
impact evaluations to be “akin to good market and client research” that may provide 
valuable information and lessons to both practitioners and policymakers. Hulme, at 
the other end, express fear that the managers of the evaluated programmes will per-
ceive impact evaluations to be a donor-driven exercise – “an external imposition 
rather than a shared opportunity.” This is partly because Hulme claims that impact 
evaluations tend to focus on proving the impact of programmes rather than improv-
ing the programmes. Although the latter objective is not incompatible with conduct-
ing an impact evaluation, it tends to be crowded out by attempts to establish the 
impact. Finally, Hulme points to the considerable lags between the initiation of an 
impact assessment and the dissemination of the results, potentially causing practi-
tioners to perceive impact evaluations to be historical rather than relevant studies.  
In this context, the evaluations presented here represent an opportunity to address 
the following three key questions: 
i) The review of peer-reviewed studies presented in Chapter 3 indicates that 
microcredit has a weak positive effect. Can this finding be corroborated by 
the evaluations conducted by donors and international organisations?  
ii) The peer-reviewed studies go to great lengths to minimize the potential bi-
ases resulting from non-random programme placement, non-random partici-
pation and non-random participant performance. Has the above-mentioned 
overlap in agendas and objectives between researchers and (donor) policy-
makers resulted in the adaptation of similar methods and considerations in 
the donor initiated evaluations?  
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iii) What about the practical relevance of impact assessments. Can the present 
review of evaluations assist in assessing the opposing views represented by 
Karlan & Goldberg and Hulme? 
The basis for answering these questions is a review of 23 impact evaluations and 5 
surveys conducted by bilateral donors, multilateral donors and international NGO’s 
over the past decade. The list of relevant studies was identified in January 2009 
through a criteria-based search of the websites of potentially relevant agencies and 
organisations.24 As even a cursory reading of other existing surveys of microfinance 
studies (e.g. Goldberg (2005) and Hermes and Lensink (2007)) will indicate, the list 
of included evaluations is not complete. We are, however, confident that the screen-
ing process as well as consultations of previous surveys has resulted in a representa-
tive list of relevant studies.  
The three key questions listed above will be addressed as follows: 
i) Summary findings of the 28 evaluations and surveys are presented in an ab-
breviated form in a separate report25, which will form the basis for the as-
sessment of the results. 
ii) An index score of how well evaluation methodologies and approach is suited 
to maximise the internal and external validity and relevance of an evaluation 
has been developed. A total of 2126 of the 23 evaluations will, as a conse-
quence, receive a score between 1 (being the highest) and 5, enabling a sys-
tematic survey of potential differences and trends in methodological 
“qualities”.27 
iii) The above-mentioned survey of the evaluations will also provide the basis 
for the ensuing discussion of the operational and practical relevance of im-
pact evaluations – a discussion that was already initiated (albeit from a meth-
odological perspective) in Chapter 2. 
                                                 
24 The search criteria as well as the agency web-sites consulted is described in a separate note that is available 
upon request. 
25 The report is almost 50 pages long and is, to conserve the brevity of this report, not included as an appen-
dix. It is, however, also available upon request. 
26 Two evaluations do not receive a score: Europeaid (2000) and Hussain et al. (1988). The latter is excluded 
because the terms of reference only cursorily include impact on household income and the former because it 
was published a full decade before the period considered in this survey. 
27 The details of the scoring methodology are presented in Appendix 2. In this context it suffices to note that 
the inclusion and weighting of both internal and external validity is an attempt to adopt a policymaker rather 
than an academic perspective in the scoring. 
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Following this introduction, the evaluations conducted by bilateral donors, multilat-
eral donors and NGOs will be presented in separate sections. The issue of whether 
impact evaluations provide relevant input to a discussion of whether to scale up a 
given programme is postponed to the subsequent Chapter 5.  
4.1 Evaluations conducted by bilateral donors 
Bilateral donors have undertaken a number of microcredit impact evaluations, both 
with the purpose of assessing supported programmes and in order to gain knowl-
edge on whether microcredit can be efficient as a development tool.  
USAID was an early and substantial contributor in the field of microfinance evalua-
tions and the accumulation and dissemination of microfinance experiences and 
practices. This resulted in a number of USAID-sponsored programmes aimed at 
providing practitioners and donors with a better understanding of how microfinance 
might reach and assist the poor. This includes Microenterprise Best Practices, Mi-
croServe, Assessing the Impact of Microenterprise Services (AIMS), and Growth 
and Equity through Microenterprise Investments and Institutions.  
Especially the AIMS programme generated several interesting and relevant studies, 
including the baseline and impact evaluations of microfinance programmes in Peru 
(Dunn & Arbuckle, 2001); Uganda (Barnes et.al, 2001a), Zimbabwe (Barnes et.al, 
2001b) and India (Chen and Snodgrass, 2001) as well as several position papers 
about measuring and interpretations of the impact of microfinance.  
The above-mentioned evaluations from Peru, Zimbabwe and India sought to de-
termine the nature, extent and distribution of impacts from participation in microfi-
nance programmes in three different parts of the world. A related objective was to 
obtain a better understanding of the role of credit within the household and the cir-
cumstances under which microfinance programmes can reach the poor. All three 
evaluations use the same approach, namely a comprehensive quasi-experimental28 
survey with clients and control groups of non-clients, supplemented with case stud-
ies of a smaller number of households to validate and (possibly) explain the mecha-
nisms underlying the evaluation findings. Though a substantial effort has been put 
into identifying control groups, bias from self-selection and programme placement 
cannot be ruled out.  
                                                 
28 The quasi-experiment undertaken is essentially the identification of a suitable control group after the pro-
gramme has been implemented. Hence, the objective is to identify a group of people/households who did 
not participate in the programme, but who, at the time of programme enrolment, resembled programme 
participants. Subsequently, the current situation of the two groups – the participants and the constructed 
control group of non-participants are compared – this is also known as “matching”.  
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The three evaluations analyse impacts on several dimensions of enterprise, house-
hold and individual welfare, and significant impacts from participation is found on 
many dimensions, e.g. income, assets, schooling (especially boys’ schooling) and 
diversification of the sources of income (reduced vulnerability). The detailed level of 
the analyses makes it difficult to extract general lessons from the evaluations. But an 
important conclusion is that microcredit tends to benefit relative wealthy house-
holds the most29. Still, the three programmes evaluated have a substantial outreach. 
The Indian SEWA Bank, for example, reports that only 13% of its borrowers 
earned an income of more than 2 USD per day. The SEWA Bank evaluation fur-
thermore finds that in some cases, clients who only have a savings account (i.e. cli-
ents who do not borrow) experienced larger impacts than clients who borrowed – 
suggesting that microcredit may not be the only financial service needed by poor 
clients.  
The fourth USAID sponsored study considered here (Barnes et.al, 2001b) was an 
impact evaluation of three microfinance programmes in Uganda. The programmes – 
in addition to the provision of credit – have compulsory savings, weekly group 
meetings, and offer insurance. A random sample of clients in rural, suburban and 
urban areas is drawn, along with a control group consisting of recently active micro-
entrepreneurs with the same gender distribution as the treatment group. The indi-
viduals are surveyed in 1997 and again in 1999, where 28% of the initially inter-
viewed individuals could not be retraced. Comparisons across groups and time 
suggest that clients benefit from participation through an increase in income, ex-
penditure and sales volume. Furthermore, the results suggest that loans can be used 
for other purposes than the planned within the household. The study does not, 
however, address possible additional differences between the control and treatment 
groups, and the high level of missing follow-up should also be a cause for concern 
when interpreting the results as self-selection and attrition may bias the results. 
In 2004 the German development aid agency GTZ published an evaluation (Jansen, 
2004) of their support to the microfinance Civil Society Organization (Calpiá) in El 
Salvador. Here, impact was defined as impact on rural clients’ income situation and 
corresponding poverty measures from 1997 to 1999. To complement the monetary-
based poverty assessment, a basic needs index was also estimated. The evaluation 
team conducted two surveys on the same households in 1997 and 1999 to form a 
panel of borrowers as well as a control group. The evaluation team was not able to 
observe whether control group members obtained loans from other sources, result-
ing in a possible bias of the results as the implicit assumption that the programme 
                                                 
29 A similar regressive effect is found in other studies, e.g. Coleman (2002) who finds that relatively wealthy 
microfinance participants tend to gain the most from participation.  
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under evaluation addresses a binding credit constraint may not be true. Levels and 
differences between the two survey rounds are compared between the treatment 
and control group.  
Results of the analysis suggest that Calpiá participation reduces income for all but 
the wealthiest households – a development, which is attributed to the accompanying 
shift in economic activities towards micro-entrepreneurial activities. This shift was, 
however, also found to be associated with a reduction in income variability (vulner-
ability). However, the study does not attempt to assign outcomes to the programme, 
so self-selection and differences between treatment and control group may also have 
exerted a significant impact upon observed outcomes.  
In the following year GTZ published another study of interest (Hannover, 2005), 
which reviews the impact of microfinance linkage banking30 in India – summarizing 
the results from three already existing studies.31 Focus is on the use of microfinance 
to achieve the Millennium Development Goals, which is interpreted as identifying 
positive effects on income, assets, poverty levels, and a number of socioeconomic 
variables. Overall, significant positive impacts on income, savings and poverty levels 
are found for both small-scale farmers, rural micro entrepreneurs and landless la-
bourers. The conclusions are, however, based on simple comparisons of before and 
after values of the relevant variables, i.e. no control group or other methodological 
issues are addressed in the study, invoking fears that self-selection and programme 
placement effects may drive the results.  
Finally, GTZ published a collection of microfinance client stories about the social 
and economic impact of microfinance in the rural areas in Northern Namibia (Pol-
zin, 2006). All entrepreneurs are members of a local microfinance associations net-
work providing basic financial services – no indications are provided as to whether 
the clients are representative or how they were selected. For each of the clients a 
detailed story of their background, economic history, strategies and plans for the 
future is provided. All client stories state very positive impacts (in terms of e.g. in-
creased income) from participation in the microfinance programme. The outcomes 
are detailed for each client, but the absence of information about sampling strategy 
                                                 
30 Linkage banking is a partnership between a regulated financial institution (e.g. a bank or credit institution) 
and one or many independent, non-regulated institution(s), such as Savings and Credit Cooperatives (SAC-
COs) or credit-only microfinance institutions. Unlike a merger, linked institutions retain their independence. 
31 Two evaluations were carried out by the Department of Economic Analysis and Research of the Indian 
National Bank for Agricultural and Rural Development, whilst the third evaluation was undertaken by a local 
NGO called MYRADA. The emphasis of the latter was on the empowerment effects of programme partici-
pation.  
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and alternative outcomes makes it difficult to validate and (possibly) transfer experi-
ences to other people/contexts.  
Also in 2006, Oxford Policy Management published an evaluation of seven microfi-
nance programmes in Pakistan for the Department for International Development 
(DFID). In addition to addressing a number of issues at the institutional level (e.g. 
financial sustainability and self perceptions) the evaluation also addressed pro-
gramme impacts at the individual client level. Two earlier studies dating from before 
policy reforms eased the provision of credit in Pakistan are reanalysed, and this is 
argued to act as a baseline for the evaluation. Clients and non-clients are inter-
viewed, and the clients reported substantial benefits from participation, which is also 
seen in relatively high profits on the investments generated from the loans. It 
should, however, also be noted that the surveyed programmes all appear to hold a 
non-market based (charitable) vision of microcredit operations, as the institutions 
are reported to be averse to charging sustainable (higher) interest rates for fear of 
being perceived as usurious and in conflict with their poverty alleviation mission. 
Furthermore, the results (not surprisingly) indicate considerable interchangeability 
of funds within households, rendering the interpretation of client based outcomes 
uncertain. Finally, the evaluation fails to address participant self-selection and possi-
ble programme placement effects, which may bias the results substantially.  
To investigate whether support to microfinance is a good poverty alleviation strat-
egy, the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA) have pub-
lished two reviews of the impact of microfinance; one based on already published 
studies and research, primarily from Asia (Bali Swain, 2004), and another based on 
SIDA’s experience with microfinance projects (Birgegård, 2004). Bali Swain reports 
that the evidence from existing impact studies is mixed. Limited evidence is found 
in favour of microfinance having an impact on consumption or income, but the 
positive impacts are mainly found for female borrowers. In addition, the review 
finds that many studies report a reduction in vulnerability, but that households near 
the poverty line are likely to benefit the most from microfinance, whereas benefits 
are almost non-existing for the extremely poor. Bali Swain also finds that in absence 
of economic growth, microfinance may result in redistribution of income rather 
than an increase of total income. And finally, some evidence of microcredit being a 
relatively cost-effective vehicle for poverty reduction is presented.  
The review of Sida’s experience in microfinance (Birgegård, 2004) briefly touches 
upon the limited number of impact evaluations made of the Swedish microfinance 
programmes. These evaluations are mainly case-studies, and in general reach the 
conclusion that participation in a microfinance programme reduces vulnerability and 
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that credit is most likely to benefit households that are relatively wealthy (own some 
assets) prior to entrance in the microfinance programme. The purpose of the study 
is broader than the present, focusing on policy options and their likely conse-
quences.  
4.2 Evaluations conducted by multilateral donors 
Compared to many of the bilateral donors international organisations and multilat-
eral donors have greater research and evaluation departments capable of lifting 
complex tasks as microcredit impact evaluation. It should therefore come as no sur-
prise that the multilateral donors have produced more evaluations of this type, but it 
should be noted that the majority of these originate from a few, highly specialized 
and highly capable organisations like the Asian Development Bank and the World 
Bank.  
Whether it is due to the regional dispersion of microfinance programmes or the 
presence of a highly skilled evaluation department, the Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) has so far undertaken far more microcredit impact evaluations than the other 
regional development banks.32 
The Asian Development Bank undertook its first evaluation of a microcredit pro-
gramme in 2001. The programme under evaluation was a training and credit project 
in Bangladesh, designed to alleviate rural poverty. The objectives of the programme 
were to provide livelihood skills training and microcredit to the landless rural poor 
and to improve the socioeconomic status of the programme beneficiaries. Finally, 
an additional objective of the programme was to strengthen the training and super-
vision capacity of the Executing Agency—the Ministry of Youth and Sports. 
The basis for the evaluation of the effects upon participant’s socioeconomic status 
was a retrospective household survey of 606 randomly selected households. The 
households were chosen from 18 centres to yield an appropriate geographical 
spread. The surveyed households were visited in 2001 and the study did not identify 
a control group or tracked performance over time. Instead, programme beneficiaries 
were asked to report the impact of microcredit upon enterprise turnover and 
household income. The self-reported effects were sought corroborated by the re-
cording of household assets and housing status. Overall, the evaluation finds im-
provements in household income, housing conditions and household enterprise 
turnover, but acknowledges that the conducted before-and-after recall survey can-
                                                 
32 The African Development Bank has, for example, only conducted a single study, which furthermore was 
not found to be relevant for this survey. 
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not be used to identify programme specific-effects as it fails to counter potential 
self-selection and programme placement biases. 
Another ADB evaluation of interest was undertaken by Gine et al. (2006) who cite 
two impact studies of microfinance institutions in the Philippines. Both impact stud-
ies seek to counter participant self-selection – one by using an instrument-variable 
approach and the other by using prospective clients as a control group. Despite be-
ing unable to meet the stated objective of reaching the poorest of the poor several 
positive impacts of the programmes are identified as participants experience an in-
crease in household expenditures, incomes and assets. In addition, the case-studies 
corroborate the positive impacts as participants report greater flexibility and higher 
income. However, despite extensive and systematic triangulation of results the pre-
sent evaluation set-up cannot completely rule out a potential programme placement 
bias. 
The ADB Operations Evaluation Department, however, revisited the above-
mentioned programmes in the Philippines in 2007 as part of a special regional sur-
vey.33 The objective of the survey was to assess the extent to which selected ADB 
microfinance programmes have reduced the poverty of rural poor households and 
improved the socioeconomic status of women. The Philippines, Bangladesh and 
Uzbekistan were selected for the study, which conducted a nationwide household 
survey to measure the impact in the Philippines, whilst smaller sample surveys 
aimed at estimating socioeconomic profile of target groups were undertaken in 
Bangladesh and Uzbekistan.  
In the Philippines the evaluation design was quasi-experimental as programme vil-
lages were matched to control villages scheduled for programme inclusion. In total 
2200 households (10 participants and 10 non-participants34 from each village) were 
included as the basis for a diff-in-diff evaluation aimed at eliminating unobservable 
fixed effects at the household and village levels. Moreover, significant efforts were 
exerted to trace and include programme dropouts in order to minimise potential 
attrition bias. In Bangladesh and Uzbekistan sample surveys were less ambitious and 
were undertaken to generate a socioeconomic profile of the target groups of the 
                                                 
33 Kondo (2007) and Kondo et al. (2008) also present the evaluation undertaken in the Philippines, adding 
only details and few supplementary analyses compared to the original ADB presentation.  
34 It should be noted that eligible non-participants were identified by village leaders or microfinance institu-
tion personnel, constituting a potential source of bias (of unknown direction and magnitude). 
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respective projects.35 Finally, approximately 200 women participated in 27 focus 
group interviews in the three countries. 
In the Philippines the positive programme impact on per capita income was found 
to be significant (at a 10% level), whilst observed differences in total expenditure 
and food expenditure were also (mildly) significant. Differences in other impact 
measures were not statistically significant, including the impact on household asset 
holdings and human capital investments. The detailed and extensive data set col-
lected enabled an analysis of impact across different levels of initial household 
wealth. This analysis indicated that impact was regressive – being positive only for 
the wealthier households within the sample, while the impact on the poorest house-
holds were found to be negative.36  
In Bangladesh and Uzbekistan participants’ self-assessment indicated that household 
income and food consumption rose following the receipt of a micro loan. The focus 
group interviews moreover indicated that microcredit had a positive effect on the 
status of women through a greater role in the generation of cash, greater involve-
ment in decision making and acquisition of skills and assets. 
Turning next to the Inter-American Development Bank (IADB) that played a piv-
otal part in establishing microfinance programmes and organizations in Latin Amer-
ica an evaluation of two microcredit programmes in Chile and Brazil was conducted 
by Aroca in (2002). In Chile, bank and NGO clients were compared to non clients 
in two regions; whilst the case study from Brazil was based on clients (two different 
banks and three different NGOs) who were compared to non-clients in five differ-
ent regions. Very little information is provided on the different contexts and client 
groups whilst propensity score matching37 is used to identify controls and correct 
for observed (and unobserved) differences. Results are equally perplexing as ob-
served differences in income are found to be statistically insignificant in Chile, whilst 
they are found to be highly significant and very large (more than 100%) in Brazil. 
Unfortunately, the very limited information about potential differences in context, 
micro credit conditions and client characteristics as well as the potential programme 
                                                 
35 In Bangladesh, a total of 200 respondents were identified from the Rural Livelihood Project and the Par-
ticipatory Livelihood Project, whilst 84 respondents from various types of financial institutions were included 
in Uzbekistan. 
36 This corroborates the findings of Coleman (1999) and (2002) and Hulme and Mosley (1996). 
37 Matching is typically based on one or several characteristics that distinguish treatment and control groups. 
Propensity score matching uses several characteristics to estimate a predicted probability of, for example, 
obtaining a loan. This probability is usually obtained from logistic regression and is calculated for both treat-
ments and controls that are subsequently matched based on their predicted probability of getting a loan. 
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placement and selection biases render interpretations and assessment of relevance 
very difficult. 
The World Bank is given its scope, influence and resources almost always a signifi-
cant contributor to the knowledge within a field, and microcredit impact evaluations 
are no exception. One of the first comprehensive (World Bank) studies on the im-
pact of microcredit was Khandker (1998)38 – a study that Khalily (2004) refers to as 
“the mother of all surveys in microfinance.” It included almost 1.800 randomly se-
lected households from 86 villages in Bangladesh. Households were clients in the 
Grameen Bank, BRAC or RD-12 and were selected on the basis of pre-survey cen-
suses and the criteria that household landholdings could not exceed 0.5 acres.  
As mentioned in Chapter 3.1 the (Pitt and) Khandker study was among the first 
evaluations to convincingly address potential selection and programme placement 
biases to establish a significant positive effect from microcredit programme partici-
pation and impact on household income and welfare. Khandker (1998) moreover 
studied village level programme effects as well as analysed the financial sustainability 
of the three organisations under review. Overall, the key conclusion of this ex-
panded version of the WB-sponsored evaluation is that microcredit programmes 
can be an effective policy instrument for reducing poverty among the sub-group of 
poor people who have the skills to become self-employed. In addition, microcredit 
programmes are found to be cost-effective and of particular importance to women.  
World Bank analysts returned to Bangladesh a few years later to re-analyse the pov-
erty impact of BRAC programmes (Zaman, 2001). In total, 500 BRAC clients and 
500 controls were given a microcredit questionnaire as part of the 1995 national 
household survey to test the dual hypothesis that microcredit mitigates vulnerability 
for all whereas impact on income is dependent on loan size (larger is better) and 
initial household characteristics (wealthier households are better suited to take ad-
vantage). A Heckman two-step estimation procedure is employed to account for 
problems related to self-selection, resulting in an analysis that to some extent cor-
roborates the initial hypothesis. More specifically, the analyses indicate the existence 
of a threshold cumulative loan size over which microcredit can result in a significant 
poverty reduction. In addition, the estimations suggest that microcredit reduce vul-
nerability through increased options for diversification, consumption smoothing 
and/or empowerment.  
                                                 
38 This is an expanded “book” version of Pitt and Khandker’ s (1999) seminal research article presented in 
Chapter 3.1. 
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Overall, the decade from the middle of the 1990’s to 2005 was characterized by high 
(and increasing) World Bank confidence in benefits and use of microcredit as an 
effective tool in the fight against poverty. The operational confidence in microfi-
nance as a development tool was, however, shaken by the CGAP evaluation of the 
World Bank portfolio of microcredit programmes (Thomas, 2006). Commissioned 
in 2005 the evaluation was conducted by a panel of three microfinance experts, who 
independently graded 66 United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) micro-
credit programmes and 69 World Bank programmes based on field visits and their 
loan repayment rates and on overall cost recovery. The results were, to say the least, 
disappointing, as less than a quarter of the programmes which funded microcredit 
were judged to be successful. The rest failed, or appeared unlikely, to produce long-
lasting, sustainable results, implying that future infusions of outside funding would 
be needed. Overall, the report described performance as “unacceptably low” classi-
fying both agencies’ programmes as being at “at the lower end of weak.” 
This no doubt provided the World Bank with further incentives to become better at 
assessing what programmes actually work and not least why. This is to a high degree 
reflected in the more recent World Bank studies. Most notably, Karlan and Goldberg 
(2007) provides a detailed overview of the methodological issues and challenges as-
sociated with doing impact evaluations in microfinance. The survey ends by con-
cluding that randomized controlled trials are “the most promising means to allow 
microfinance institutions to assess reliably the effectiveness of their operations on poverty alleviation 
and for investors and donors to learn which types of programmes produce the strongest welfare im-
provements.” 
Finally39, Diagne and Zeller (2001) of the International Food Policy Research Insti-
tute (IFPRI) is another multilateral donor/organisation that provides a novel per-
spective to microcredit impact evaluation. Evaluating four microcredit programmes 
operating in the five districts of Malawi the basic assumption underlying this evalua-
tion is that the impact of the credit programmes includes the effect on potential cli-
ent’s perceived ability to lend rather than just the actual loans provided. If 
households think that they in times of crisis will receive a loan they will, according 
to Diagne and Zeller, be willing to change risk taking behaviours. As a consequence, 
the analysis departs from standard practice and makes the distinction between ac-
cess to credit (formal or informal) and participation (in formal credit programmes or 
in the informal credit market). A household has access to a particular source of 
                                                 
39 EuropeAid (2000) is another multilateral donor evaluation of microcredit. It does, however, focus on mi-
crofinance institution institutional performance rather than on individual impact, implying that it was not 
considered relevant for this survey. 
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credit if it is able to borrow from that source, although for some reasons it may 
choose not to. 
The data to test this hypothesis come from a three round study of 404 households 
in 45 villages in five districts of Malawi. The study took place in 1995 and involved 
asking respondents quite abstract (and for some hypothetical) questions about their 
perceived ability to obtain a loan from one (or more) of the four microfinance insti-
tutions under evaluation. A two-stage (maximum likelihood based) estimation 
method, similar to Heckman’s two-step procedure for Tobit models, is used to es-
timate the effects of access to or improvements in access to credit, but the study 
finds no significant effect of access to credit on net crop income, per capita in-
comes, food security and nutritional status of credit programme clients. This leads 
to the conclusion that the “contribution of rural microfinance institutions to the income of 
smallholders can be limited or outright negative if the design of the institutions and their services 
does not take into account the constraints on and demands of their clients.”  
4.3 Evaluations conducted by international NGOs 
International NGO’s (many of them Bangladeshi40) have played pivotal roles in the 
development and dissemination of microcredit innovations and lessons, making it 
natural to consider the impact evaluations conducted by them. As a consequence, a 
number of evaluations conducted by some of the most well known and resourceful 
international NGOs are described here.  
BRAC is one of the largest microfinance institutions in Bangladesh officially target-
ing households with less than 0.5 acres of land and whose main occupation is man-
ual labour. The former criterion is, however, in practice more adhered to than the 
latter. Still, BRAC has been found to recruit a significant proportion (50-60%) of its 
clients among the ultra-poor. Earlier studies have moreover found that 80% of 
BRAC credit is invested in income generating activities by the borrowing household. 
BRAC conducted two large impact evaluations of its Rural Development Pro-
gramme (RDP) in the 1990’s (Mustafa et al. (1996) and Husain et al. (1998)). The 
first evaluation by Mustafa et al. undertook a large collection of data that included: 
(i) a household survey of 2125 BRAC and non-BRAC members over two rounds to 
capture seasonal variability, (ii) village profile surveys of 225 villages of which two-
thirds had a BRAC programme, and (iii) 15 Village Organisation Case studies under-
taken to contribute to the understanding and analysis of the socio-economic context 
                                                 
40 The Bangladesh microfinance industry is described and analysed in detail by several studies including: 
Khandker (1998), Matin (2003), and Khalily (2004). 
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of BRAC members. The objective of the evaluation was to assess the impact of the 
RDP programme at household and individual lender level. 
Unfortunately, the evaluation did not fully utilize the wealth and details of the data 
collected. The analysis was, as pointed out by Khalily (2004), by and large descrip-
tive in nature, resorting to OLS41 regression analysis and comparison of average 
outcomes across members and non-members, not testing the findings of the de-
scriptive analysis. In particular, considerable attrition coupled with using length of 
relationship with BRAC-RDP as a key impact outcome could result in biased re-
sults. 
Subsequently, Husain et al. (1998) conducted a follow-up study, which in addition to 
the parameters considered in the 1996 study also looked at poverty reduction and 
empowerment (in its various forms). In total, 1700 households (of which 1250 were 
BRAC beneficiaries) were included in the follow-up study. Unfortunately, the possi-
bility of using the resulting panel data to assess the effect(s) of RDP credit on 
households and individuals was not utilized in the study. Overall, the findings of the 
first study was confirmed as RDP credit appeared to have a significant and positive 
impact on non-land assets, net worth, savings and children’s schooling. The follow-
up study, however, also raised a question about the sustainability of the impact given 
that household assets were found to decline for members associated longer than 
four years. Again, however, reservations about the robustness and validity of the 
results must be voiced given the descriptive and non-systematic nature of the analy-
sis.  
In another recent impact evaluation of another BRAC programme Barua and 
Suleiman (2007) evaluate the Northwest42 Microfinance Expansion Project (NWEP) 
providing financial and non-financial services to poor women. Survey data were 
collected in 2003 and 2007 from eight BRAC branch offices in six districts. In total 
1100 households were surveyed at the baseline – all of them beneficiaries of the 
BRAC project. The 2007 follow-up was able to find 92% of the original cohort. In 
addition to using the panel structure of the data collected IV43 estimation was used 
to correct for biases resulting from participant variation in initial stock of assets 
and/or capabilities.  
                                                 
41 Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) is a frequently employed method to estimate an underlying model thought 
to be responsible for a set of observations. The basic principle is to estimate the model that minimizes the 
aggregated distance between the observed value and the value given by the model. 
42 The North-western provinces of Bangladesh are poorer and relatively underserved with microcredit insti-
tutions compared to the rest of the country. For these reasons BRAC initiated the Northwest Expansion 
Programme. 
43 Variables related to the programme officers of the respective branch offices were used as instruments. 
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Overall, Barua and Suleiman find that the NWEP membership resulted in a signifi-
cant improvement in household stock of assets (measured as quality of housing and 
ownership of durable goods). In addition, household poverty levels (measured by a 
poverty scorecard) were significantly reduced over the period. 
Another well known and influential Bangladeshi microfinance institution is, of 
course, the Grameen Bank, which (in addition to being evaluated by, for example, 
Khandker, 1998) was subject to an early evaluation of its effects upon employment 
(Hossain, 1988). For the evaluation a survey was conducted of 280 households in 
five Grameen Bank villages and two control villages. After regression-based com-
parisons of the average treatment household and the average control household in-
dicated reasonable levels of similarity between treatments and controls, impact was 
assessed as average differences in outcome between treatments and controls. The 
fact that self-selection was not taken into account in analysis of the data collected 
can perhaps explain the very large effects found. More specifically, Hossain finds 
that obtaining a Grameen Bank loan adds an extra 12 days/month to household 
employment. The extent to which this represents a reallocation from previously un-
recorded activities is, however, also unclear.  
The Grameen Bank also sponsored the survey of microfinance impact evaluations 
conducted by Goldberg (2005). The overall conclusion from this survey is one of 
optimism. Goldberg concludes that despite heterogeneous programmes and pro-
gramme contexts microcredit appears to be able to lift participants’ income and/or 
improve their livelihood. In addition, Goldberg calls for more (and better) research 
and that an “incontrovertible study” (which is synonymous with a randomized con-
trol trial) showing a positive impact will be of “enormous benefit” to the microfi-
nance industry. 
4.4 Summing up 
With the exception of one study (Diagne and Zeller, 2001) the impact evaluations 
conducted by bilateral and multilateral donors as well as by a number of high profile 
international NGOs find (often significant) positive effects of micro-credit on 
household income or expenditures. This finding is irrespective of evaluation meth-
odology and of the scoring presented in the subsequent Chapter 5. Hence, in con-
trast to the peer-reviewed evaluations the donor sponsored impact evaluations find 
almost unanimous support for a positive effect of microcredit. 
Many evaluations contain lengthy considerations as to whether the microcredit pro-
gramme under evaluation reached a stated target audience of the poorest of the 
poor – they never did. This leads some to conclude that the effect of microcredit is 
regressive, benefiting the wealthier clients relatively more. Although some evalua-
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tions point in this direction no systematic evidence was found to support this – only 
a general agreement about the difficulties associated with reaching and assisting the 
poorest of the poor. Hence, despite the general agreement that “microfinance 
works” the aforementioned ambiguity should give rise to a disclaimer noting “… 
but not necessarily for all.”  
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5. Scaling-up as a basis for scoring the evaluations? 
The scoring methodology has been developed to summarize and synthesize the 
overall assessments of the surveyed microcredit evaluations. It is, as any composite 
index, a simplified representation dependent on both implied definitions and the 
ultimately ad hoc weighting of underlying factors.44 Value added will consequently 
stem from the identification of trends. 
The perspective adopted in the construction of the methodology is that of a policy 
maker facing a scaling-up decision. The question of scaling-up has preoccupied gov-
ernments and donors since the first success stories of microcredit came out of 
Bangladesh in the early 1980s. Addressing to what extent a program can be scaled-
up is, however, surprisingly difficult. It will among other things involve balancing 
the internal and external validity of the evaluation. Internal validity of an evaluation 
is concerned with estimating the true average treatment effect of the group affected 
by the programme, whilst the external validity deals with whether the causal effect 
can be generalized to other contexts and groups (see e.g. Meyer, 1995). To be sure, 
internal validity—the focus of academic studies—is not a “sufficient statistic” for 
policymakers interested in scaling up; they need to worry about external validity as 
well (see e.g. Rodrik, 2008).  
As an example, consider a setting with two types of microcredit borrowers, safe and 
risky. Assume that the local credit market is being served by a profit-maximizing 
informal lender. If we introduce a subsidized microcredit lender relying on the 
group-lending technology into this environment, the new lender will attract the safe 
borrowers. This increases the average riskiness of the remaining borrowers (a sort-
ing effect), causing the informal lender’s average credit risk to rise (Bose, 1998) and 
scale advantage to fall (Hoff and Stiglitz, 1998).45 As a result, the introduction of a 
subsidized microcredit lender worsens credit conditions for risky borrowers, i.e. 
those without access to microcredit. This may leave the economy as a whole worse 
off.  
                                                 
44 The scoring methodology is described in detail in Appendix 2. The individual factors underlying the com-
posite score is made available in Appendix 3, enabling still critical readers to form alternative composite 
scores. 
45 Recall from the Kaboski and Townsend (2005) study that microcredit institutions reduce borrower reliance 
on informal moneylenders. 
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Consequently, an impact evaluation focusing solely on the group served by a subsi-
dized microcredit lender may (by the above logic) find unambiguous positive ef-
fects. However, the evaluation misses general equilibrium effects, which (by the 
same logic) can be negative. Put differently, an evaluation in this case would have no 
external validity. Even randomized evaluations are problematic unless accompanied 
by complementary studies.  
Philosophers of science (e.g., Cartwright, 2007) thus argue that randomization will 
not even necessarily ensure internal validity. The problem is that evaluators are 
unlikely to rely exclusively on pre-defined rules and instructions when implementing 
an intervention as complex as a randomized experiment. This introduces a risk of 
subjective judgements into the experiment, rendering randomization no different 
from other econometric techniques. That is, if the premises on which the method 
rests are fulfilled, valid causal inference is ensured; if not, the conclusions derived 
from a randomized experiment may be as wrong as the results of any method of 
analysis.  
In this light, case studies and even anecdotal evidence should not be discarded up 
front due to a “lack of rigor”. Such “soft” evidence may, if collected according to 
transparent and representative criteria, be both internally and externally valid. The 
validity and precision of the conclusion is not assured by choice of a specific meth-
odology. In this context, it is interesting to note that the Chinese, who pioneered 
experiment-based policymaking, never relied on randomized experiments. China 
successfully scaled up local policy innovations that appeared to work in specific con-
texts (Heilmann, 2008), relying mostly on soft evidence (Ravallion, 2009). As noted 
by Ravallion, it appears that reasonable lessons could be distilled from such “ex-
periments”. 
The above discussion suggests that a basic premise for the evaluation scoring meth-
odology presented here is that no method a priori is perceived to be superior, at 
least when scaling up is the aim.  
The following three dimensions have been identified as relevant when designing the 
scoring methodology to accommodate the question of scaling-up: 
i) Evaluation prerequisites: This dimension includes information about the pro-
gramme subject to evaluation as well as the context under which it operates. In 
addition, the question of data and information availability and quality is also ad-
dressed here. Are conclusions based on sufficient data, enabling proper identifi-
cation of programme effects? This dimension is thus included to survey how 
well the evaluation provides information about the content and context of the 
programme subject to evaluation. 
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ii) Addressing non-randomness: This dimension is included to assess the extent to 
which the evaluation succeeds in negating the effects due to non-random pro-
gramme placement, non-random programme participation, and non-random 
programme participant performance. In addition, the fungibility of funds must 
be addressed – at minimum with the inclusion of a household level of measure-
ment. 
iii) Robustness and relevance: This dimension is based on an assessment of the ex-
tent to which evaluation conclusions are supported by the application of differ-
ent methodologies and/or sources. Furthermore, the degree to which the 
external validity of evaluation results is addressed by evaluators is also consid-
ered in this dimension.46  
The three dimensions are by choice non-substitutable and assigned equal weight. By 
implication, an evaluation that successfully addresses potential biases due to non-
random placement, participation and performance will only score high if details of 
the programme content and context is provided alongside considerations of the 
generalizability and robustness of the findings.  
A total of 21 evaluations47 are scored on a scale from 1 to 5, where “1” is the high-
est score, reflecting an evaluation that comprehensively address all three dimensions, 
whilst a score of “5” represents an evaluation that fails to address one of the three 
dimensions and only addresses the other two in a rudimentary and incomplete fash-
ion. As mentioned previously, all 21 evaluations have been published over the past 
decade by bilateral and multilateral donors (8 and 9 evaluations, respectively) and 
large NGOs. Table 1 below provides a break-down of the distribution of scores 
according to type of institution: 
Score 5 4 3 2 1 Average score
Multilateral donors 0 2 4 2 1 2.8 
Bilateral donors 1 1 3 3 0 3.0 
International NGOs 0 1 1 2 0 2.8 
Table 1: Scoring of micro credit evaluations 
                                                 
46 It could be considered to include programme cost and cost-effectiveness under this dimension. This 
would, however, be a symbolic and non-distinguishing gesture as only the evaluations that already receive the 
highest score of 1 include any information and analyses related to programme costs. 
47 A list of the 21 evaluations and their scores is provided in Appendix 3 
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As is apparent from both the distribution of scores and average scores there is vir-
tually no difference across multilateral and bilateral agencies. Only Khandker (1998) 
– at the time denoted the “mother of all surveys” (Hulme, 2000) – stand out with a 
collection of data that spanned years, surveying a large number of households in 
multiple locations significantly raising the costs and technical skills imposed upon 
the implementing agency.  
According to Effron (2007) multilateral development banks and bilateral donors 
spend approximately the same share (1-2%) of their administrative budgets on 
monitoring and evaluation, but as budgets are larger in multilateral development 
banks this would enable them to undertake such larger evaluations as well as to 
build the necessary in-house capacity and skills to undertake these more demanding 
evaluations. Whether this is the explanation is, of course, open to speculation as the 
choice of evaluation methodology may also depend on the demand for knowledge, 
the presence of dedicated and skilful individuals and the level of institutional pre-
paredness (Levine 2006). 
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Figure 1: Scoring of micro credit evaluations by year 
Looking at whether a trend can be observed Figure 1 depicts how scores evolve 
over time. Of the 21 evaluations undertaken over the past decade 11 have been pub-
lished in last five years. Average score obtained over the last five years was 3.2 
which is worse than the 2.8 average (remember: 1 is the best score) obtained in the 
first part of the decade. The absence of a clear trend over time also becomes appar-
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ent looking at Figure 1, depicting scores for the three types of evaluating agencies 
according to publication year. 
Attempting to deconstruct the scores, there appears to be a tendency towards the 
older evaluations being better at addressing relevance and robustness of the results, 
whilst the more recent evaluations perform better in terms of addressing the biases 
that may arise from non-randomness. This is, however, a tentative conclusion based 
on few observations.  
Overall, the application of the scoring methodology indicates that: 
1. Multilateral and bilateral donor evaluations (with the exception of large 
“flagship” evaluations) are approximately equally well suited as part of 
the basis on which to make a decision of whether to scale-up microcredit 
programmes or not. 
2. No clear trend emerges over time. If anything, the potential usefulness 
of the evaluations in terms of deciding whether or not to scale-up has 
declined. This conclusion, however, rests on very few evaluations. 
In terms of the future, programme statements and survey papers from the respec-
tive agencies indicate an inclination towards becoming better at addressing the in-
ternal validity of evaluations. Whether or not this will compromise the external 
validity of the same evaluations remains to be seen. 
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6. Conclusion  
The key objective of this study has been to address the following question: On the 
basis of existing evaluations, what can be said about the causal impact of micro-
credit programmes on participant household consumption and/or income?  
According to impact evaluations conducted by International Development Coop-
eration Agencies, the causal impact of microcredit on consumption and/or income 
is almost always significantly positive. This holds across different types of micro-
credit programmes and contexts. Unfortunately, these evaluations do not meet ap-
propriate methodological standards in terms of addressing non-random selection 
issues. Peer-reviewed evaluations do not suffer from these methodological weak-
nesses but generally fail to find similar positive results. In fact, focusing only on in-
ternal validity, the most convincing studies find no impact of microcredit 
programmes on the level of income. Therefore, as also noted by Banerjee et al. 
(2009), microcredit does not appear to be the miracle it is often claimed to be.  
The implications for donor support to microcredit programmes are not straightfor-
ward. Although peer-reviewed studies tend to find no effect, they have limited ex-
ternal validity. An educated decision about the appropriate scale of programmes 
must balance external and internal validity. Contexts and programmes differ, and it 
would be reckless to extrapolate from only a handful of studies, rigorous or other-
wise. The conclusions emerging from the peer-reviewed studies, however, should 
serve to make us more sceptical about what can realistically be achieved through 
microcredit. Moreover, microcredit programmes continue to rely on donor subsidies 
for their continued existence. Hence, even an unequivocal positive impact would 
not be sufficient for continued funding. Sufficiency would require both a positive 
impact and that microcredit is the most cost effective policy among all policies with 
this positive impact. In sum, there are no magic bullets!  
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Introduction and background 
Microcredit is regarded as a key development tool when it comes to reaching the 
poor and vulnerable. The (still growing) appeal of microcredit rests on its reliance 
on private enterprise as well as the (perhaps perceived) notion that channelling 
money to the poor through microfinance can be effective, sustainable and profit-
able.  
As a consequence of the growing recognition and use of microcredit, the UN desig-
nated 2005 to be the International Microcredit Year. In addition Bangladeshi 
economist and microcredit pioneer, Mohammad Yunus and the high-profiled 
Grameen Bank (founded by Yunus) shared the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize for their 
efforts to create economic and social development from below.  
Microcredit has in effect become part of the mainstream development toolkit, 
which has resulted in a parallel and very significant growth in funding and outreach. 
The increase in outreach is, for example, reflected in the 2008 annual report of the 
Microcredit Summit Campaign. The report summarizes data collected from more 
than 3,300 microcredit institutions reporting to reach 133 million clients by the end 
of 2006. This is up from approximately 600 institutions reporting having reached 13 
million clients just nine years earlier.  
Despite the broad recognition (and increasing commercialization) of microcredit, 
thoroughly tested knowledge about its impact and effect arguably remains partial 
and contested. The knowledge base has mostly consisted of anecdotal evidence, case 
studies and research that did not account for the potentially severe problems related 
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to endogeneity (see below) and/or failed to measure associated costs and benefits 
properly. 
This is, however, beginning to change as recent and emerging research address key 
questions of whether and why microcredit works. The recent contributions can be 
categorized into:  
o Controlled and quasi experiments: Gine et al (2006), Karlan and Zinman 
(2007), and Cason et al (2008) all attempt to untangle causal relationships 
within microcredit by conducting controlled experiments (microcredit 
games), in which a few parameters are randomly varied and the effects meas-
ured. Coleman (1999) is an example of a quasi-experimental approach. 
o New estimation techniques: The research conducted by Kaboski and Town-
send (2005) represent a novel estimation techniques using variations in poli-
cies and institutional characteristics to evaluate the impacts of village-level 
microcredit institutions in rural Thailand. Recent donor-based evaluations 
also occasionally rely on propensity score matching to create synthetic con-
trol groups. 
o Comprehensive surveys: Hermes and Lensink (2007) present research filling 
an entire issue of the Economic Journal (volume 117, issue 517) devoted to 
presenting evidence on the impact of microcredit. Goldberg (2005) summa-
rizes and synthesizes the evidence emerging from case studies, whilst Ar-
mendariz and Morduch (2005) is a thorough and comprehensive analysis of 
the available economic research.  
Overall, the research based evidence base have thus been both growing and devel-
oping in new directions over the past five years. Whether this is also the case when 
it comes to the donor-based evaluations is not entirely clear at this stage. Some de-
velopment cooperation agencies appear to have conducted comprehensive evalua-
tions and analyses of microfinance programmes, including: The International Food 
Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). It is, 
however, not clear whether this is a trend. 
The context of a growing evidence base, substantive developments in evaluation 
methods and the growing mainstream adoption (and financing) of microcredit has 
prompted the Evaluation Department of Danida to commission a synthesis of the 
recent research and available finalized evaluations of support to microcredit. 
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Following this introduction the next section will outline the proposed approach, 
whilst the subsequent section describes the setup and practical details concerning 
the synthesis.  
 
Approach 
The key objective of the synthesis is to address the following key question: What 
works in microcredit? What can be said about the causal impact of a microcredit 
programme once an experimental/quasi-experimental evaluation design is applied? 
 Answering this question will be the key focus of the synthesis report and will take 
up the majority of the consultants’ time and the final report. Secondary, and related 
to the above-mentioned key question, the consultants will also look into the meth-
odology used in current microcredit evaluations undertaken by International Devel-
opment Cooperation Agencies. This includes assessing the strengths and 
weaknesses associated with current evaluation methodologies? 
The work preparing the synthesis will fall in three phases: literature survey and iden-
tification of relevant studies, drafting the report, presenting the report and getting 
feedback from external reference group before finalising the report. 
Phase 1 
A literature survey will be undertaken to identify a gross list of studies and evalua-
tions that should be included. The identification of studies on the gross list will be 
based on the following criteria:  
o Definition: As mentioned previously microfinance in principle covers all 
types of financial services (credit, savings and insurance), whilst microcredit 
is the provision of small loans. The latter will be the focus of the studies and 
evaluations considered for this synthesis evaluation. 
o Period: Pitt and Khandker (1998) was an influential study because it was 
among the first attempts to use statistical methods to generate a truly accu-
rate assessment of the impact of microcredit. Hence, most relevant studies 
will by implication be from the last decade, rendering attempts to define any 
other period than this unnecessary.  
o Geographical coverage: Other synthesis evaluations published by the Danida 
Evaluation Department focus on sub-Saharan Africa, reflecting the overall 
distribution of development challenges and aid across the major regions. The 
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concentration and influence of microcredit institutions and programmes in 
South East Asia and Latin America will, however, make it difficult to main-
tain (and justify) a focus on SSA when it comes to microcredit. Hence, al-
though no specific geographical orientation will be imposed, the basis for the 
synthesis is likely to be dominated by studies of South East Asian or Latin 
American origin.  
o Type of studies/evaluations included: The focus on methodological rigour 
and empirical testing is expected to result in (but will not be restricted to) a 
focus on empirical studies presented in peer-reviewed journals.  
In addition, answering the question of what methodology is used in current micro-
credit evaluations undertaken by International Development Cooperation Agencies 
will, of course, also necessitate a survey of evaluations conducted by bi- and multi-
lateral organisations.  
o Type of impact considered: Here focus will be on studies that attempt to 
measure the causal impact of microcredit on economic outcomes such as 
consumption and income. Although of obvious and central importance this 
is, as pointed out by Armendariz and Morduch (2005), not sufficient basis to 
act.  
Funding and implementing agencies should also consider and assess the cost-
effectiveness of the programmes under evaluation. This will, however, be outside 
the scope of this synthesis evaluation. In addition, evaluations and studies that con-
sider support given to develop microcredit infrastructure and/or tools (like, for ex-
ample, customer or institutional rating schemes) will not be considered either.  
Having identified studies that are relevant and meet the above mentioned criteria, 
the consultants will present a list of evaluations and studies, which will also be an-
nexed to the final report. Based on the list the consultants will propose a sample of 
evaluation and studies to be analysed in more detail in the report. The sample, 
which will be approved by the Evaluation Department of Danida, should be se-
lected based on the above mentioned criteria. 
Phase 2 
Based on the list of selected studies, the consultants will complete a draft report that 
seeks to answer the two key questions: (i) what can be said about the causal impact 
of a microcredit programme once a proper evaluation methodology is applied? And 
(ii) what type of evaluation methodology is applied by development cooperation 
agencies when it comes to assessing impact? 
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The studies and evaluations contributing to answering the question of “what 
works?” must to some extent have addressed the potential problems such as en-
dogenous programme participation and placement, which may contaminate the 
evaluation design and result in biased causal inference. 
Phase 3 
The consultants will present a draft report subject to discussion and feed-back from 
both Danida staff and a reference group of external experts established for this 
study. 
Suggested members of the external reference group include: 
o Nikolaj Malchow-Møller, Department of Business and Economics, Univer-
sity of Southern Denmark 
o Yet to be decided  
The input collected from Danida and the reference group will be used to finalise the 
report. The final report will be a synthesis report of not more than 30 pages plus 
appendices.  
The final synthesis report will be published and made available on the Internet by 
the Evaluation Department of Danida.  
 
Study setup 
The team of consultants will consist of: 
o Team leader Jens Kovsted, Ph.D., Centre for Economic and Business Re-
search, CBS, 
o Thomas Barnebeck, Associate Professor, Ph.D., Department of Economics, 
University of Copenhagen, 
 
The Synthesis Evaluation will be managed by the Danida Evaluation Department, 
but officials from other departments in Danida can be consulted during the elabora-
tion of the Synthesis Evaluation.  
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The work of the consultants will commence at 1. December, 2008. Total working 
time allocated to this project is 12 weeks of which 6 are reserved for Thomas Ba-
rnebeck.  
The proposed set of evaluations and studies to be included in the sample will be 
presented to Danida not later than 5. January 2009. 
A draft report will be submitted to the Evaluation Department of Danida not later 
than 3. March 2009, and a final report not later than two weeks after comments to 
the draft report have been received from the consultants undertaking the study. 
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Appendix 2. Scoring methodology 
 
The scoring of evaluations has been based on the degree of compliance with the 
following requirements: 
Prerequisites 
1.1. A detailed and thorough description of the programme under study, ena-
bling the reader to assess the context and potential consequences for the 
external validity 
1.2. Surveys include a sufficient number of observations and are carefully de-
signed to enable identification of treatment effects 
Non-random effects  
2.1. Non-random programme participation (i.e. self-selection of individuals 
into the programme) has been addressed 
2.2. Non-random programme placement has been taken into account 
2.3. Non-random programme performance (differences in treatment effects 
and attrition between groups) have been taken into account – unless the 
interest is explicitly stated to be in the “treatment effect on the treated” 
2.4. Loan fungibility between the assisted household member/enterprise and 
the entire household is addressed 
Robustness and relevance 
3.1. The extent to which programme insights and conclusion is of relevance 
to policy and programme design in other contexts (the question of exter-
nal validity) is discussed 
3.2. A number of techniques (e.g. surveys, case studies etc.) have been used to 
complement the analysis and test for robustness (triangulation) 
Each of the relevant evaluations has been assigned a score on a scale ranging from 1 
to 5, where 1 is given to a study which complies with all or almost all of the above 
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requirements and 5 is given to a study which complies with none or very few of the 
above requirements as indicated below: 
Score Prerequisites Non-random effects  Robustness and relevance 
1 All issues are addressed 3 of 4 issues are addressed All issues are addressed 
2 All issues are addressed 2 of 4 issues are addressed 1 issue is addressed 
3 1 of 2 issues are addressed 2 of 4 issues are addressed 1 issues is addressed 
4 1 of 2 issues are addressed 1 of 4 issues is addressed 1 issue is addressed 
5 1 dimension is not addressed, and the others are addressed at a rudimentary level 
 
Please note that:  
• The listed scoring criteria are non-substitutable across the three dimensions. 
Hence, an evaluation that only address one of the four issues raised under 
the heading “non-random effects” will receive a score of 3, regardless of how 
the same evaluation score under the other two dimensions listed. As conse-
quence, the table is applicable to combinations of scores that are not listed in 
the table above.  
• How detailed and comprehensive an evaluation will have to be in order to 
meet one of the nine criteria listed is based on our (subjective) assessment. It 
will, however, not suffice to merely acknowledge the existence of a potential 
problem of non-random programme participation – the evaluation will have 
to actively address the problem. 
• Some of the criteria may be considered interdependent. The application of 
appropriate statistical methods will, for example, depend on the existence of 
a sufficient number of observations. Complementarities and overlap of this 
nature is, however, impossible to avoid, implying that the reviewer will have 
to take it into account in a systematic and consistent manner. 
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Appendix 3. Evaluation scores 
The 21 evaluations that were scored according to the just presented scoring meth-
odology were: 
Name of study Score 
Polzin (2006) Koshi Yomuti – Banking under the tree  5 
Hannover (2005) Impact of microfinance linkage banking in India  3 
Jansen (2004) Measuring impact of microfinance: The case of Financiera Calpiá, El Salvador 4 
Oxford Policy Management (2006) Poverty and social impact assessment: Pakistan microfinance policy 3 
Barnes et al. (2001) The impact of three microfinance programs in Uganda 3 
Dunn and Arbuckle (2004) The impacts of microcredit: A case study from Peru 2 
Barnes et al. (2001) Microfinance program clients and impact: Zambuko Trust, Zimbabwe 2 
Chen and Snodgrass (2001) The Impact of SEWA Bank, India 2 
ADB (2001) Project performance audit report on the Rural Training Project, Bangladesh 3 
ADB (2006) The Rural Microenterprise Finance Project in the Philippines 2 
ADB (2007) Effect of microfinance on poor rural households and the status of women 2 
Kondo (2007) Impact of microfinance on rural households in the Philippines: Empowerment 3 
Kondo et al. (2007) Impact of microfinance on rural households in the Philippines 4 
Aroca (2002) Microcredit impact assessment: The Brazilian and Chilean cases 4 
Khandker (1998) Fighting poverty with microcredit 1 
Zaman (2001) Assessing the poverty and vulnerability impact of microcredit in Bangladesh 3 
Karlan & Zinman (2007) Expanding credit access using randomized supply decisions to estimate the impact 3 
Diagne and Zeller (2001) Access to credit and its impact on welfare in Malawi 3 
Mustafa et al (1996) Beacon of hope: an impact assessment of BRAC’s rural development programme 2 
Barua and Sulaiman (2007) Impact evaluation and client satisfaction: NME Project, Bangladesh 4 
Husain et al. (1998) The second impact assessment study of BRAC’s Rural Development Programme 3 
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